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MODERNITI, ISLAMISASI PIMPINAN NEGARA DAN RESPONS 
MASYARAKAT BUKAN-MUSLIM: SATU KAJIAN KES MASYARAKAT 
KRISTIAN DI SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA 
ABSTRAK 
Sebahagian besar daripada abad ke-20 telah menyaksikan para sarjana yang 
mengkaji agama berpendapat bahawa moderniti akan menyebabkan agama 
disingkirkan dari ruangan awam. Namun demikian, peristiwa-peristiwa seperti 
Revolusi Iran ke peranan agama Katolik dalam konflik-konflik politik di Amerika 
Latin yang tercetus dalam dekad 80an membuktikan bahawa agama masih 
memainkan peranan yang penting dalam ruangan awam. Tesis ini menghujahkan 
bahawa agama masih memainkan peranan dalam kehidupan awam dan politik 
masyarakat Asia Tenggara masakini. Dengan menggunakan kes Malaysia, tesis ini 
menghujahkan bahawa Malaysia tidak sahaja mengalami kebangkitan agama di 
kalangan pelbagai komuniti agama di negara ini walaupun mengalami proses 
modernisasi tetapi juga ia tidak berundur ke ruangan persendirian. Sebaliknya, proses 
modenisasi memudahkan agama masuk ke ruangan awam. Kebangkitan Islam di 
akhir dekad 70-an menyaksikan sesetengah pihak Muslim memanggil supaya 
kerajaan and masyarakat diIslamisasikan. Panggilan ini telah menyebabkan kerajaan 
Barisan Nasional yang diketuai UMNO melaksanakan dasar Islamisasi untuk 
mempertahankan hegemoninya atas masyarakat Melayu-Muslim. Dasar Islamisasi 
telah menyaksikan peningkatan campur tangan kerajaan bukan sahaja dalam bidang 
agama Islam tetapi juga dalam bidang keagamaan bukan-Islam. Akibatnya 
masyarakat bukan-Islam mula mengalami sekatan bukan sahaja dalam bidang agama 
mereka tetapi juga dalam kehidupan sehari-harian mereka. Tidak menghairankan 
mengapa masyrakat bukan-Islam mula beralih kepada agama mereka sebagai satu 
xi 
 
sumber daya politik dalam usaha mengatasi masalah ini. Tesis ini akan menumpukan 
perhatian kepada masyarakat Kristian di Semenanjung Malaysia dalam usaha 
menyelidik cara-cara bagaimana komuniti ini menggunakan agama untuk mencipta 
ruang yang membolehkan mereka untuk membebaskan diri dari gangguan kerajaan 
dalam bidang agama dan kehidupan sehari-harian mereka. Tesis ini menghujahkan 
bahawa agama merupakan satu titik tumpuan untuk memobilisasi masyarakat bagi 
menghadapi keadaan sosial dan politik yang mereka hadapi. Sebagai kesimpulan, 
tesis ini mengutarakan hujah bahawa bertentangan/konflik berdasarkan agama dalam 
ruangan awam disebabkan oleh ketegangan yang timbul dari pengejaran moderniti. 
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MODERNITY, STATE-LED ISLAMISATION AND THE NON-MUSLIM 
RESPONSE: A CASE STUDY OF CHRISTIANS IN PENINSULAR 
MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
For a better part of the 20
th
 century, scholars who studied religion held the 
opinion that religion would gradually lose its public significance in the face of 
modernisation. However, events in the past few decades have proved otherwise. 
From the Iranian Revolution to the role of Catholicism in political conflicts 
throughout Latin America in the 1980 have patently demonstrated religion still plays 
an important role in the public sphere. This thesis takes the position that religion still 
remains an important precinct in the public life and politics of contemporary 
Southeast Asian societies. Using the case of Malaysia, I argued that not only did the 
country experienced religious revivalism across the various faith communities 
despite the rapid modernisation that was taking place here but also it did not retreat 
to the private sphere. Indeed, it facilitated the entry of religion into the public sphere. 
Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s among the Malay-Muslim community witnessed 
the call by certain quarters of the community for the Islamisation of the state and 
society. This in turn has egged the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional government to 
implement its own Islamisation policy in order to maintain its hegemony over this 
critical group in society. The resultant policy has brought about an increasing 
intrusion of the government not only into the Muslim religious field but also into the 
non-Muslim religious field. As a result, non-Muslims began to experience a growing 
restriction not only of their religious spheres but also of their everyday lives. Not 
surprisingly, they began to turn to religion as a political resource in an attempt to find 
xiii 
 
some sort of political footing to negotiate this increasing restriction. Focusing on the 
Christian community in Peninsular Malaysia, this thesis seeks to study the ways in 
which this community used religion to create space that enable them to manoeuvre 
the increasing intrusion by the government into their religious sphere and everyday 
lives. This thesis takes the position that religion provides a focal point in mobilising 
people to respond to the social and political circumstances which they find 
themselves in. Indeed, the central theoretical position forwarded by this thesis is that 
religious based contestations/conflicts in the public sphere are due to the tensions 
that arise out of the pursuit of modernity.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction: Secularisation, Politics and Religion 
Modernisation, it was once argued, would dislodge religion from its once 
prominent place in the public life of contemporary Southeast Asian societies. Religion 
would retreat to the private sphere leaving the public sphere to “secular” forces such as 
the nation-state and the market along with other cultural, institutional and ideological 
features of modernity (Casanova, 1994).  
This thesis takes a different position. It argues that religion still remains an 
important precinct in the public life and politics of contemporary Southeast Asian 
societies despite the rapid modernisation that is taking place in this region. Any 
understanding why this is so must take into account the role of the state in the 
modernisation process.  
In other words, individuals and communities find themselves drawn into the 
operations of state power. One of the forces that drive the state is the need to mould its 
diverse local population to a modern nation. This exercise together with its symbolic and 
material trappings invites boundary-making which rejects or exclude symbols and 
practices considered foreign to the wholeness that the state seeks to impose on society. 
Consequently, the national public discourse tends to focus on the wholeness of the 
nation at the expense of the fact that society is characterized by diversity. More often 
than not, such discourses on national wholeness tend to be grafted in ideologies that 
emphasize on exclusionary identity based on ethnicity, language and religion (George 
and Willford, 2005, pp. 13-14).   
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It is, however, a mistake to view the state as omnipotent in its intervention in 
society as if it is “guided ... by a single will ... or by a kind of uniform animating spirit 
with an overwhelming power to enforce its ideological  vision or to construct knowledge 
as it sees fit” (Steedly, 1999, p. 443). It does well to remember that the nature of the 
state itself is complex, and often fragmented, which lead to contradictions, limits and 
failures not only in its intervention in society but also at the ideological level.  
On the surface, the overwhelming presence of the state may obscure the fact that 
people have the capacity to respond to the social and political circumstances they find 
themselves in. Such capacity provides opportunities for individuals and communities to 
take advantage of – or succumb to – the state. 
The question that guides this thesis is: In what ways do people use religion to 
create space to escape the state's intensifying reach into everyday life? Such activity 
does not mean that people are taking an oppositional or resistant stance against the state. 
Rather, as George and Willford (2005, p. 11) put it:  
Individuals and groups can be quite calculating or complicit in using the state (and its 
internal contradictions) in advancing their interests, religious or otherwise, in an effort to 
find some kind of political footing in relation to the state. 
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1.1 Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Malaysian Society 
Malaysia offers an interesting case study for our purpose. As with many other 
post-colonial societies, the question of identity is deeply embedded in the nation’s 
political discourse which had deeply affected the political, social and economic 
structures of the country.  
Identity in the national political discourse takes the form of ethnicity as the 
country is characterized by a plural society. With the granting of independence by the 
British in 1957, the Malaysian post-colonial state had devoted much of its energy in 
trying to transform its diverse population into a modern nation. 
However, as Geertz (1973a) had noted almost fifty years ago, the state's attempt 
at nation-building will inevitably run into the shoals of primordial sentiments (traditional 
identities and loyalties) that have a more concrete reality than that of the abstract notion 
of nation-state. What resulted from this encounter is a complex interplay between the 
state's nation-building project and these traditional identities and loyalties which would 
deeply affect the political, social and economic structures of Malaysian society. 
Therefore, the Malaysian state's project that aimed at wholeness is mired with the 
contingencies of a plural society that reflect a basic division between the indigenous 
Malays and non-Malays.
1
 One needs to look no further on this issue than at the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia. As with other modern constitutions, it explicitly carries the 
modern notions of citizenships in the document.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Cheah (2002).  
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Interestingly, the same document also defines who is a Malay. Such definition 
carries with it certain social and political privileges.
2
 On the other hand, the constitution 
is silent on a definition of a non-Malay, presumably because it is the anti-thesis of the 
official definition of a Malay. And in so doing, the founding document of Malaysia has 
officially created two basic categories in which to place its citizens.  
Consequently, ethnicity played an important component in forming social 
identities in Malaysia where social relationships are largely determined by “kaum” or 
“bangsa” (race, ethnicity). Apart from serving as an identity marker that helps one to 
identify oneself vis-à-vis others, ethnicity also served a political purpose, i.e. a tool of 
the state for the purpose of political control and resource allocation (Ackerman and Lee, 
1990, p. 4).    
Although modernisation has transformed the social and economic structures of 
the country, religion has remained deeply embedded in Malaysian society (Nagata, 
1984; Ackerman and Lee, 1990). Like ethnicity, religion is deeply intertwined with the 
individual's sense of self which complicates the picture with the increase of potential for 
political mobilization (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 4).  
The joining of ethnicity and religion in the country has dichotomized the 
religious sphere into two separate fields, i.e. Muslim and non-Muslim. The Muslim field 
is principally a Malay domain since all Malays are by definition Muslim by birth. Those 
who voluntarily leave this field lose the social and political privileges as well as face 
state sanctions, implying that Malay-Muslim identity is materially and politically 
reinforced (Ackeman and Lee, 1990, p. 4).  
 
                                                 
2
 See Article 160 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
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The non-Muslim field, on the other hand, is basically a non-Malay domain where 
identity and ethnicity are more loosely defined, and more importantly, it is not under-
girded by any political and material privileges. Non-Malays are free to associate 
themselves with any religion of their choosing although typically a Chinese is a 
Buddhist-Taoist while an Indian a Hindu.  
However religions such as Christianity have attracted followers from non-Malays 
in general. Religious affiliation among non-Malays does not carry any material and 
political privileges. Although the connection between religion and ethnicity is loose in 
the non-Muslim field, “there is an undefined sense of solidarity among non-Malays that 
they are not Muslims” (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 5). 
The relationship between the Malays and non-Malays in the present period have 
assume a greater significance as the latter are confronting the Malays on the question of 
the rights of non-Islamic religions. The root of this conflict can be traced back to the 
mid-1970s when Islamic fundamentalism began to spread among urban Malay youths.
3
 
Generally speaking, this phenomenon can be partially attributed to the rising Islamic 
consciousness among Muslim societies worldwide as well as to the alienating effects of 
modernisation on the Malays (Nagata, 1984; Chandra, 1987; Shamsul, 1997).  
More importantly, given heightened ethnic consciousness in the country after the 
May 13 racial riots, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism among Malay youths can be 
interpreted as an attempt by the Malays to use Islam as an ethnic boundary to distinguish 
themselves against the non-Malays (Nagata, 1984). The use of Islam is unsurprising, as 
                                                 
3
 I’m aware that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” is a contentious term which some have interpreted in 
a pejorative sense. However, in this thesis, fundamentalism simply means revisiting its ‘cumulative body 
of ritual, behavior, and thought that reaches back to the time of origins’ (Ruthven, 2004, p. 15) as a 
response towards modernity.  
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it has served as a vehicle of political expression for the Malays in previous times. As 
Ackerman and Lee (1990, p. 6) pointed out: “Relatively speaking, the Malays – despite 
their factions and conflict – are more united politically under the banner of Islam ... The 
emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s has revitalized Malay ethnicity”.  
The growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism among the Malays egged on 
the state to respond by initiating its own Islamisation agenda that aimed at “moralizing 
economic and social policies through a modernist interpretation of Islam. One 
consequence of this moralizing Islamic discourse has been an increasing reification of 
ethnic and religious boundaries through their bureaucratic codification and 
materialization of political representation” (Willford, 2005, p. 45). This, in turn, has 
brought about the increasing encroachment of the state in the everyday life of not only 
the Malays but also the non-Malays. 
Unsurprisingly, Islamic revivalism and the state’s Islamisation policy brought 
about a parallel religious revivalism among the non-Malays that is partially a response to 
the alienating effects of modernity and as an act of re-affirming one’s social identity in 
the face of what is happening in the Malay-Muslim religious field (Ramanathan, 1996; 
Loh, 2003). As a result, everyday interactions in contemporary Malaysia are mediated 
by cultural distinctions centred upon ethnicity and religion.  
Religion has become an important political resource for individual and groups as 
they attempt to create space that enable them to manoeuvre the increasing encroachment 
of the government into their everyday lives (Nagata, 1984; Ramanathan, 1996; Lee and 
Ackerman, 1998; Loh, 2003; Willford, 2007).   
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1.2 Research Question and Methodology 
This thesis is interested in looking at the ways in which non-Malays use religion 
in an attempt to create space that enable them to manoeuvre the increasing encroachment 
by the government into their everyday lives. More specifically, it will focus on the 
Christians in the country. The central question which this thesis seeks to answer is: How 
are the Christians responding to the state’s Islamisation project which is increasingly 
encroaching on their religious and everyday life spheres? 
It should be noted that Malaysia is geographically divided between the peninsula 
and Sabah together with Sarawak. This thesis focuses on the Christians in the peninsula 
rather than Sabah and Sarawak (where Christians make up for more than half of the total 
population of both states combined).  
There are two reasons why Christians in the peninsula – who form a small 
proportion of the population in this geographical – are chosen as the focus of this study. 
Firstly, the emphasis on the ethno-religious marker in the politics of peninsula is 
markedly stronger than it is in Sabah and Sarawak. Such emphasis on the ethno-religious 
marker is most clearly seen in the recent high court ruling over the issue on the right of 
non-Muslims, i.e. Christians, to use the word “Allah.” On 31st December 2009, the high 
court ruled in favour of the Catholic newspaper, the Catholic Herald, that it had the right 
to use the word “Allah” in its Bahasa Malaysia section in spite of the ban by the 
government.  
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Immediately after the ruling, a few churches in the peninsula experienced a rash 
of attacks on its buildings all over the peninsula where the cause of the attack was the 
court’s ruling. Some Muslim non-government organizations organized public protests 
against the ruling and in the blogosphere and traditional media; there were heated 
debates on the issue which highlighted the ethno-religious contradictions that have beset 
society in the peninsula. By focusing on the Christians in the peninsula, the thesis throws 
into sharp relief the research question at hand.  
Secondly, modernisation in Malaysia has proceeded unevenly with the peninsula 
experiencing a rapid pace of urbanization and economic development as compared with 
Sabah and Sarawak. Urbanization and economic development coincide with the rise of 
the middle class in the peninsula. As I will point out in the next section, the rise of the 
middle class and its participation in religion highlights the role of the middle class in 
transforming lay participation in churches. In so doing, they have also transformed the 
way in which the community responds to the state’s increasing encroachment into their 
religious sphere.  
From a methodological standpoint, this thesis will utilize the qualitative approach 
in data collection.
4
 The primary instrument which I used to collect the data for analysis 
is the interview. I interviewed Christians across the denominational line and those from 
the clergy and laity. In addition, some of the interviewees serve in institutions such as 
the Christian Federation of Malaysia, the Methodist Education Council, etc. The 
                                                 
4
 This thesis does not bring any methodological innovation to the table. The methodology which I have 
employed in this thesis is based on the standard approach as expounded in standard methodological texts. 
For this thesis, I have consulted Blaikie (2000); Esterberg (2002); and Seale, et al (2006) on the standard 
methods of data collection in the qualitative methodology.  
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interviews were designed to elicit opinions as well as individual and institutional 
responses to the state’s encroachment on their religious sphere.  
In addition to the interview, I have also used the participant–observation method 
as another means towards data collection. My primary research site was a small 
evangelical Protestant church located in the heart of Kuala Lumpur which I have 
observed for the past two years. Apart from this primary research site, I have also 
participated in a few conferences organized by some Christian organizations to discuss 
issues that confront the community.  
In addition to the two instruments which I have used, data collection was further 
complemented by the use of secondary literature and primary documents which I have 
collected during my time in the field and in the library. Once the data had been 
collected, I analyzed the data to generate the answer to the research question which I 
have posed.   
1.3 Literature Review  
This section serves two objectives. Firstly, it will review the major theoretical 
works on the relationship between religion and society. The aim here is to gain a broad 
overview of our current state of knowledge in this area, and therefore, provide us with an 
entry point into this thesis proper. Secondly, it will also construct a theoretical 
framework with which to frame the analysis of this thesis.  
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1.3.1 Modernisation, Secularisation and the Death of Religion 
Casanova (1994, p. 211) argued that secularisation theory has served as the 
“main theoretical and analytical framework through which the social sciences have 
viewed the relationship of religion and [society]” and “may be the only theory which 
was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences. … 
indeed, [it] is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theories of the modern world that 
one cannot discard [it] without putting into question the entire web, including much of 
the self-understanding of the social sciences” (Casanova, 1994, p. 17).  
This situation is unsurprising as this theory can trace its intellectual ancestry all 
the way back to the founding fathers of the social sciences where “[i]n one form or 
another, … was shared by all the founding fathers: from Karl Marx to John Stuart Mill, 
from Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer, …, from Emile Durkeheim to Max Weber, 
from Wilhelm Wundt to Sigmund Freud, …, from Robert Park to George H. Mead” 
(Casanova, 1994, p. 17). As a result, the “consensus was such that not only did the 
theory remain uncontested but apparently it was not even necessary to test it, since 
everybody took it for granted. This means that [secularisation theory] often served as the 
unstated premise of many of the founding fathers’ theories, it itself was never either 
rigorously examined or even formulated explicitly and systematically” (Casanova, 1994, 
p. 17). 
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Nonetheless, the foundations for the latter formulation of this theory can be 
found in the works of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Both scholars shared  
… the view that the old historical religions cannot survive the onslaught of the modern 
world. Both take for granted that, in Durkheim’s worlds, ‘the old gods are growing old 
or already dead’ and that, in any case, they will not be able to compete with the new 
gods, which Durkheim believed modern societies would create for themselves, or the 
modern polytheism of values and its unceasing and irreconcilable struggle which, 
according to Weber, has resulted from the process of differentiation of the various 
secular spheres as they press to realize their own ‘internal and lawful autonomy.’ The 
old churches, for Weber, remain only as a refuge for those ‘who cannot bear the fate of 
the times like a man’ and are willing to make the inevitable ‘intellectual sacrifice’ 
(Casanova, 1994, p. 18).  
 
It was through the works of such scholars such as Peter Berger (1969), Thomas 
Luckmann (1967) and Bryan Wilson (1982) among others – drawing on the insights of 
Weber and Durkheim – that this theory began to be systematically formulated.  
However, it should be noted that one of the major difficulties in discussing the 
theory of secularisation is that there is no one accepted formulation of the theory as 
such. Rather, the so-called theory is but a plurality of formulations. This has led critics 
such as Hadden (1987, p. 598) to argue that secularisation theory is nothing more than “a 
hodgepodge of loosely employed ideas” rather than a formal theory as such.5  
On the other hand, Tschannen (1991) had demonstrated that there exists a 
sufficient consensus among the theorists that qualifies secularisation theory to be 
understood as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1970). The theory contains “a 
very broad set of assumptions and analytical categories” (Tschannen, 1991, p. 395) 
shared by all the theorists even though they may disagree in the details.  
 
                                                 
5
 See also Shiner (1966). 
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Broadly speaking, all accounts of the theory of secularisation share a single 
narrative concerning the trajectory of religion in the modern world. According to Haynes 
(1997, p. 713), secularisation theory  
… implies a unidirectional process, whereby societies move from a sacred condition to 
successively areligious states; the sacred becomes increasingly social and politically 
marginal. … secularisation was an integral facet of modernisation, a global trend. 
Everywhere, …, religion would become privatised losing its grip on culture, becoming a 
purely personal matter, no longer a  collective force with mobilising potential for social 
change.”  
 
At the core of this theory lies the proposition that modernisation is the key 
determinant that will ensure the long-term decline of the social significance of religion 
in the modern world. Herbert (2003, p. 35) puts it in the following statement: 
‘Modernisation’ itself is a complex and contested concept that refers to a range of inter-
related processes operating at economic, political, social and cultural levels and 
originating in Western Europe since the fifteenth century, … at an economic level these 
developments include the expansion of the capitalist system and the spread of 
industrialization, enhanced in the second Industrial Revolution (from 1850) by the 
widespread application of scientific knowledge and possibly entering a new stage, with 
the emergence of increasingly service-oriented and information-based economies. 
Politically, they include the emergence of nation states and the development of 
bureaucracy to deepen their power, but also the development of representative 
institutions and concepts of individual rights. At a social level they include the 
breakdown of face-to-face communities (Gemeinschaft) by urbanization and increased 
mobility, leading to modern society (Gesellschaft) of strangers and anomie …, but also 
unprecedented individual opportunities.  
 
More specifically, modernisation brings with it three processes that will ensure the 
gradual decline of religion. We will now look at each of these processes separately in 
order to gain a fuller understanding of secularisation theory.  
1.3.1(a)  Social Differentiation  
The central feature of modernisation is the process of social differentiation which 
Tschannen (1991, p.404) identified as “absolutely central to all the secularisation 
theories, without exception.” Briefly, social differentiation refers to “the increasing 
division and specialization not only of labour but also of many areas of human activity” 
(Herbert, 2003, p. 35).  
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Modernisation requires that society develops a series of social spheres, e.g., 
politics, economics, education, legal etc, where each sphere became differentiated from 
one another as each follows its own internal logic or what Weber calls as their “internal 
and lawful autonomy” (quoted in Casanova, 1994, p. 20).6 What follows from this 
process was that 
[some] of [these] spheres, particularly the emerging modern absolutist state and the 
emerging capitalist economy, were more lawful and more autonomous than the others. It 
would probably show as well that it was their differentiation from one another, their 
mutual dependence and their clashes, that more than anything else dictated the dynamics 
of the whole process. Actually, these two secular spheres, states and markets, now 
tended to dictate the very principles of classification which served to structure the new 
modern system (Casanova, 1994, pp. 20-21). 
 
At the same time,  religion “came fully into its own, specializing in ‘its own religious’ 
function and either dropping or losing many other ‘nonreligious’ functions it had 
accumulated and could no longer meet efficiently” (Casanova, 1994, p. 21).  
What resulted from this process was the declining importance of religion in 
different aspects of social life. For example, medieval Christianity opposes the practice 
of usury – charging interest for monetary loans – which it considered as “sinful.” With 
the advent of modern capitalism, such behaviour is considered as part of the normal 
economic practice in modern society which has discarded the dictates of religious logic 
of such behaviour in favour of its own “internal and lawful autonomy,” i.e., maximizing 
profit.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Italics in the original. 
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To sum up, social differentiation brought about a condition where religion 
gradually loses control over various aspects of social life which became increasingly 
“secularized” which the Oxford Dictionary defined as “not concerned with religion.” 
This definition, perhaps, gives the best encapsulation of the fate of religion in the 
modern world. 
1.3.1(b) Privatisation 
The next feature associated with modernisation is that of “societalization” which 
refers to the process of “human life [becoming] increasingly enmeshed and organized, 
not locally but societally (that society being most evidently, but not uniquely, the nation 
state)” (Wilson, 1982, p. 154). More specifically, it refers to the breakup of small rural 
communities that follows from industrialization where religion had served to bind such 
communities together.  
With industrialization came urbanization which resulted in the disengagement of 
religion from the larger urban communities. Religion could no longer function as the 
integrative force, in the Durkheimian sense, of society. The process of social 
differentiation witnessed the emergence of new social spheres that began to supplant the 
governing religious sphere by fragmenting daily social life into the public and the 
private spheres. Whereas in pre-modern society, religion had governed the conduct of 
daily life ranging from the marketplace to everyday behaviour, now it finds itself 
relegated to the realm of the private that is irrelevant to the conduct of the public sphere, 
which is based on the criteria of instrumental logic (Wilson, 1982).  
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Conversely this situation that takes place in the objective realm of the social 
world is also replicated in the subjective realm of the individual consciousness. Religion 
could no longer provide a plausible structure (that is provide a meaningful universe for 
the individual), to borrow a concept from Berger (1969), to support a religious 
worldview. In its place is the rational worldview with its utilitarian conception of the 
world.  
What is significant about this process is that the quest “[for] subjective meanings 
is a strictly personal affair. The primary ‘public’ institutions (state, economy) no longer 
need or are interested in maintaining a sacred cosmos or public religious worldview” 
(Casanova, 1994, p. 37). This was because each sphere operates under its own “internal 
and lawful autonomy” based on rationality rather than the dictates of theology.7 In the 
end, religion became a matter of private faith which is of no concern to the political life 
of modern societies.  
1.3.1(c) Rationalisation 
The final aspect which is associated with modernisation is “rationalisation.” This 
process refers to the abandonment of the religious worldview which emphasises the 
supernatural and the adoption of a rational worldview which emphasize natural causes in 
understanding the workings of the world around the individuals (Weber, 1958; Berger, 
1969; Wilson, 1982). As a result, religion becomes increasingly anachronistic in a world 
where the rational worldview takes hold of the mind of people.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Weber (1958) for a classic treatment of this theme. 
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Given these three processes of modernisation, it is unsurprising that 
secularisation theory maintains that religion would lose its hold over social life and 
gradually retreat from the public sphere (Shelledy, 2004, p. 150). Herbert (2003, p. 35) 
puts it more succinctly when he said: “[m]odernization is at the heart of secularisation 
theory: it is the deep structure leading to the long-term decline of the social significance 
of religion.”  
Unsurprisingly then, social scientists – before the 1980s – do not generally 
consider religion as a substantive area of research. Greatly influenced by secularisation 
theory, they “[perceive] the process of modernisation … as one of fundamental change 
from a traditional socio-political order to a modern one. [They argued] that 
modernisation generates new integrative symbols and structures and fosters the process 
of secularisation; in short, religion and religious values are destined to lose their place 
with the advent of modernisation” (Verma, 2002, p. 89).8  
1.3.2 Shattering the Orthodox Consensus 
For almost a century since the late 19
th
 century, secularisation theory reigned 
supreme in the study of religion in the modern world. It was considered the orthodox 
consensus among social scientists on the fate of religion in the modern world.  
However, beginning with the 1980s, the orthodox consensus was irrevocably 
shattered when religions worldwide, rather than withdrawing, began to actively 
participate in society socially as well as politically with events such as the rise of the 
religious right in America as a political force, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in 
Islamic societies, the political agitation of the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the 
                                                 
8
 See Almond and Powell (1966) for a classical statement of secularisation theory in political science.  
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involvement of the Catholic Church in political conflicts in Latin America (Casanova, 
1994, p.3).
9
 
In this section, I will be reviewing some of the key alternative theories that have 
emerged in this area in order to give us a broad understanding of the current theoretical 
understanding among social scientists on the fate of religion in the modern world.  
1.3.2(a) Rational Choice Theory 
One recent challenge mounted against the theory of secularisation was by a 
group of American sociologists (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; Iannaccone, 1992a; Finke 
and Iannaccone, 1993; and Warner, 1993). They argued that modernisation is irrelevant 
to the survival of religion in the modern world. Instead it was argued that the “rates of 
religious beliefs and practice follow cycles over long period of time (hundreds of years) 
and are largely determined by market conditions” (Herbert, 2003, p. 43).  
Known as the “supply-side” or “religious economy” theory – based on the 
rational choice theory found in economics – its basic insight is that  
… religious regulation and monopolies create lethargic religions … but that capable 
religions thrive in pluralistic, competitive environments. Capable religions thrive 
because their religious ‘entrepreneurs’ capitalize on unregulated religious environment 
to aggressively market their religions to new ‘consumers’; in these environments 
religious ‘firms’ (denominations and traditions) that possess superior organizational 
structures (denominational polities), sales representatives (evangelists and clergy), 
products (religious message), and marketing (evangelistic) techniques flourish. Those 
that do not cannot successfully compete and so decline numerically. Nonetheless, with 
pluralism and competition, at the aggregate level, the total amount of religious 
participation in the society increases, since more and more religious consumers are 
induced into participation by the variety of religious products that satisfy their needs and 
wants (Smith,1998, p. 73). 
 
 
                                                 
9
 For a sample of the burgeoning literature on the vitality of religion in the modern world, see Tamney 
(1979), Marty and Appleby (1991), Casanova (1994), Martin (1996), Smith (1998), Berger (1999), Kim 
(2000), and Jenkins (2002). 
  
18 
 
Using this theory, Finke and Stark (1992) argued that American churches were 
able to increase their membership from the end of the eighteenth century to the present 
day because it has never established a state religion, i.e., religious monopoly, while the 
opposite can be observed from the Western European experience. Church membership 
has declined exactly because state churches there struggled to maintain their position as 
a religious monopoly where choice is restricted.   
1.3.2(b) Strictness Theory  
 
A variation of rational choice theory, the “strictness theory” looks at the “micro-
level normative demands and expectations that different religious groups impose on their 
members” (Smith, 1998, p. 71) as an explanation for religious vitality. Briefly, this 
theory argues that “strict” religious groups will thrive while “lenient” religious groups 
suffer decline in membership. The two most important proponents of this theory are 
Dean Kelley (1972) and Laurence Iannaccone (1992b; 1994).  
Using statistics and graphs, Kelly (1972) demonstrated that since the 1960s 
mainline-liberal Protestant churches in the United States have faced numerical decline 
while at the same time conservative churches are experiencing growth. The reason 
suggested was that the former are lenient while the latter are strict.  
According to Kelly (1972), the business of religion is to provide its adherents 
with meaning and a religious group can only thrive if it can deliver on its promise 
(Kelly, 1972, p. 36-46). As a caveat, he pointed out that such meanings are not merely 
religious ideas and concepts which “do not require anything of those who espouse them” 
(Kelly, 1972, p. 52). Rather religious ideas and concepts demand commitment in terms 
of lifestyle and value system.  
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As Kelly (1972, pp. 52-53) puts it: 
We want something more than a smooth, articulate verbal interpretation of what life is 
all about. Words are cheap; we want explanations that are validated by the commitment 
for the other persons. … What costs nothing accomplishes nothing. If it costs nothing to 
belong to a community, it can’t be worth much. So the quality that enables religious 
meanings to take hold is not their rationality, their logic, their surface credibility, but 
rather the demand they make upon their adherents and the degree to which that demand 
is met by commitment.
10
   
 
Unsurprisingly, mainline-liberal Protestant churches are faltering exactly because 
they are “lenient,” i.e., espousing relativistic beliefs and values together with an 
appreciation for a plurality of lifestyles and views. Apparently, such leniency has 
produced a membership that is characterized by “lukewarmness (indecisiveness and 
reluctance to sacrifice for the group), individualism (personal autonomy, resistance to 
discipline, readiness to leave the group), and reserve (reluctance to share faith with 
others or insights and convictions with the group)” (Smith, 1998, p. 72).  
By contrast, the conservative wing of Christianity in America is “strict,” i.e., 
demand high levels of conformity in terms of beliefs and lifestyles. It has produced a 
membership that is characterized by “high levels of commitment (willingness to 
sacrifice for the religious group), discipline (willingness to obey leaders and accept 
discipline) and missionary zeal (eagerness to spread the faith)” (Smith, 1998, p.72).  
As a result, “lenient groups, by making few demands, fail to authenticate for 
their followers the meanings their faith espouses, they tend over time to weaken and 
decline. Strict religious groups, on the other hand, successfully generate satisfying 
meaning and so thrive and grow” (Smith, 1998, p. 72). 
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Iannaccone (1992b; 1994) also contends for the “strictness” thesis but from a 
different point of view. He argued that certain religious groups grow and thrive in 
modern society not because it offers richer meanings for its adherents but rather they 
screen out free riders – people who want to enjoy the benefits of the religious group 
while contributing little to the group.  
He argued that it is not possible in a strict and demanding religious group for a 
member to enjoy religious benefits, e.g., worship services, pastoral care and counselling 
as well as wedding and funeral services without at the same time contributing a 
proportionate amount of time, energy and money back to the church.  
Such “investments” are necessary for the group to generate such “collective 
goods” in the first place. As a result, such groups that screen out free riders are able to 
enjoy a high degree of commitment, solidarity and investment among its members. In 
turn, this enables such religious organizations to grow and thrive in modern societies. By 
contrast, lenient religious groups that do not screen out free riders will generate fewer 
religious benefits as too many free riders take more than what they give thereby creating 
an environment of apathy and disinterest among its members which will lead to the 
decline of such religious organizations (Iannaccone, 1994). 
Although rational choice theory and strictness theory do not directly address the 
issue of the relationship between religion and politics, it would seem that both theories 
share the fundamental assumption made by secularisation theory, namely politics is 
demarcated from personal faith.   
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1.3.2(c) Subcultural Identity Theory of Religious Strength 
 
Smith (1998) in his study of religious vitality in America noted that 
“[c]ontemporary American Evangelicalism is thriving. It is more than alive and well. … 
it appears to be the strongest of the major Christian traditions in the United States” 
(Smith, 1998, p. 20).
11
 The question is why this traditional religious movement is 
thriving in a society that epitomizes modernity when conventional wisdom in the 
sociology of religion has argued the decline of religion in modern society.  
Using the following dimensions as indicators for religious vitality:  
(1) faithfully adhere to essential Christian beliefs; (2) consider their faith a highly salient 
aspect of their lives; (3) reflect great confidence and assurance in their Christian beliefs; 
(4) participate regularly in a variety of church activities and programs; (5) are committed 
in both belief and action to accomplishing the mission of the church; and (6) sustain 
high rates of membership retention by maintaining members' association with the 
tradition over long periods of time, effectively socializing new members into that 
tradition, and winning new converts to that tradition (Smith, 1998, p. 21).  
 
Smith (1998) discovered that evangelical Christians scored high in all the dimensions 
above.
12
 This discovery begs the question stated above. Offering what he calls a 
“Subcultural Identity Theory of Religious Strength,” and contrary to the secularisation 
theory, he argued that   
American evangelicalism…is strong not because it is shielded against, but because it 
is—or at least perceives itself to be—embattled with forces that seem to oppose or 
threaten it. Indeed, evangelicalism…thrives on distinction, engagement, conflict, and 
threat. Without these, evangelicalism would lose its identity and purpose and grow 
languid and aimless. Thus … the evangelical movement's vitality is not a product of its 
protected isolation from, but of its vigorous engagement with pluralistic modernity 
(Smith, 1998, p. 121).  
                                                 
11
 Evangelicals are a subgroup within Protestant Christianity which is essentially conservative. They cut 
across denominational lines and sometimes are founded outside of denominations.  
12
 In this study, Smith (1998) together with a team of researchers conducted 130 two-hour interviews in 
the summer of 1995 which was then followed by a telephone survey of 2,591 respondents between 
January and March of 1996 where 2,087 identified themselves as Protestant Christians. Then, in the 
summer of 1996, follow-up face-to-face interviews were conducted with 96 respondents who identified 
themselves as evangelicals from the phone interviews after which an additional 85 evangelicals from local 
evangelical churches were also interviewed. Finally, a phone interview was conducted with eight people 
who identified themselves as fundamentalists and six who had identified themselves as liberal Christians, 
Smith (1998) 
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His theory, in a nutshell, can be stated in the following propositions.  
 
Religion survives and can thrive in pluralistic, modern society by embedding itself in 
subcultures that offer satisfying morally orienting collective identities which provide 
adherents meaning and belonging. … In a pluralistic society, those religious groups will 
be relatively stronger which better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to 
create both clear distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other 
relevant outgroups, short of becoming genuinely countercultural (Smith, 1998, pp. 118-
119).
13
 
 
In other words, he is simply saying that evangelicals are thriving because they draw their 
group identity by identifying an out-group or groups (often menacing) where they then 
draw real and symbolic boundaries between themselves and such groups. As a result, 
religious vitality is maintained in the face of modernisation.  
1.3.2(d) Religion in a Postmodern World 
One word that has gained increasing currency within social-scientific discourse 
in recent years is “postmodern.” At the risk of simplifying the concept, postmodern 
denotes a condition of scepticism towards what Lyotard (1986) calls “metanarratives” or 
background stories that give justification to the quest for truth or certainty (e.g., science 
and religion). Unsurprisingly, some social scientists offer an explanation on religious 
vitality based on the postmodern perspective.  
Using empirical data derived from the World Values Surveys (1981 and 1991) – 
a comparative study of 43 societies around the world – Inglehart (in Herbert 2003, p. 45) 
relates the process of modernisation to cultural changes (which include religious 
changes). He argued that modernisation theory as expounded by secularisation theorists 
is roughly correct for one phase of modernisation, but that it fails to capture the changes 
that occur as populations in advanced industrial societies reach a point where increases 
in material wealth no longer convert into perceptions of an increased quality of life 
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(Herbert, 2003, p. 45). At this stage, issues such as the environment, spirituality, etc, 
become more important as it has an impact on the quality of life.  
Here, we are witnessing a shift from “materialist values” to what he calls as 
“postmaterialist values”: 
The term ‘Postmaterialist’ denotes a set of goals that are emphasized after people have 
attained material security and because they have attained material security … The 
emergence of postmaterialism does not reflect a reversal of polarities but a change of 
priorities: Postmaterialists do not place a negative value on economic and physical 
security – they value it positively, like everyone else; but, unlike materialists, they give 
even higher priority to self-expression and to quality of life (Inglehart, 1997 cited in 
Herbert, 2003, p. 45). 
 
Inglehart calls this process “postmodernisation” which have various features that are 
associated with cultural postmodernism, i.e., “a revalorization of tradition, a renewed 
emphasis on culture, a decline in ‘metanarratives’ (certainty-giving stories), whether in 
science, religion or the nation, which proceed from the earlier process of modernisation 
which have succeeded in bringing about economic growth but at the expense of quality 
of life” (Herbert, 2003, p. 45). As a result, 
Postmodernisation represents a shift in survival strategies, from maximizing economic 
growth to maximizing survival and well-being. … [N]o strategy is optimal for all 
conditions. Modernisation … probably also increased psychological stress. … 
Postmodernisation, on the other hand, has a mildly negative linkage with economic 
growth, but a strong positive linkage with subjective well-being. With the transition 
from Modernisation to Postmodernisation, the trajectory of change seems to have shifted 
from maximizing economic growth to maximizing the quality of life (Inglehart, 1997 
cited in Herbert, 2003, p. 46). 
 
Such a context, he goes on to suggest, may be fertile grounds for religions that 
can accommodate such zeitgeist which usually means newer forms of religions such as 
the New Age movement, new religious movement and new styles of traditional religions 
rather than the traditional authoritarian religions, e.g., Roman Catholicism (Herbert, 
2003: 46). Religion then, as this theory seems to imply, is becoming a personal choice 
which carries no public significance.  
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1.3.2(e) Glifford Geertz and Karen Armstrong on the Persistence of Religion in the 
Modern World 
Geertz (1973b) begins by pointing out that humanity is by nature a creature that 
seeks to find meaning for his existence through religion. The function of religion is “to 
synthesise a people’s ethos – the tone, character and quality of their life, its moral and 
aesthetic style and mood – and their world view – the picture they have of the way 
things in sheer reality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order” (Geertz, 1973b: 89).  
In other words, religion provides people with a narrative frame from which to 
make sense of the world around them and thereby finding their place in the world. By 
fulfilling this function, religion is able to persist in the modern world despite the rise of 
the modern rational mindset.  
Karen Armstrong (2000) in her book “The Battle for God” extended Geertz’s 
insight by forwarding the political implications of the global resurgence of religion. 
Religion provides a narrative frame for the individual to find meaning and thereby 
orienting him/her to the world in which they live. 
Modernisation did not relegate religion either in the dustbin of history or into the 
private sphere of beliefs. Rather religion had entered into the public sphere making it 
heard and not ignored by the state. The persistence of religion in the modern world was 
due to the fact that it essentially provides people with what she calls “mythos” which 
“provided people with a context that made sense of their day-to-day lives” (Armstrong, 
2000, p. xv).  
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Modernisation with its overemphasis on rationality displaced mythos in the 
modern world. This left people bereft of a resource which can help them make sense of 
their everyday lives. Disoriented, some have chosen to return to religion to access 
mythos to overcome the sterile world of rationality. However, this turn is not a return 
towards pre-modern forms of religion but was rather “modern forms of faith that was 
often highly innovative, ready to jettison centuries of tradition” (Armstrong, 2000, p. 
279).  
This turn towards religion is not a matter of personal conversion alone but carries 
with it political overtones that had drawn a battle line in society between the religious 
and the secular. The former, feeling embattled, have decided  that they must take the 
battle of bringing God back into history from which he had been excluded by the 
secularist in an attempt to preserve their vision of the world from being destroyed by 
modernisation. It is ironic to note that while the religious rejected the spirit of 
modernity, they did not reject the modern tools provided by modernity in achieving their 
aims (Armstrong, 2000). 
More importantly, she argued this turn towards religion is not a throwback to the 
pre-modern forms of faith but rather a specific modern response to the pitfalls of 
modernity which threatens to bring nihilism. Such response is not just a personal 
conversion of the individual towards a private faith but an active faith that seeks to 
participate in the political sphere in the name of God in order to preserve what is 
perceived as an attempt to exclude the sacred from the rest of society, and hence, a threat 
to their worldview.  In so doing, religion has entered back into the political arena against 
the prediction of secularisation theory (Armstrong, 2000).  
 
